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“Islamic jurisprudence” texts in medieval and early-modern juridical culture from the Indian sub-continent. 
Premodern Muslim jurists composed doctrinal treatises primarily in Arabic, the shared theological 
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status of a language of Islamic law. From the fourteenth century, fatāwā compilations were made in 
Persian. By seventeenth-century Mughal rule in northern India, sharḥ or “commentary” and ḥāshiya or 
“super-commentary” in Persian were deployed as a mechanism for pedagogical transmission. Analyzing 
two extant Persian manuscripts pertaining to the Ḥanafī madhhab or “school” of juridical thought, 
Fatāwā-i fīrūzshāhī (fourteenth century) and ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq Sajādil Sirhindī’s Sharḥ-i hidāya (seventeenth 
century), the essay appraises the nature of textual and manuscript practices involved in generating 
Islamic juridical norms and practices. Examining philological and textual features exhibited internal to 
these two texts, I argue that fiqh doctrinal writing in the age of post-classical Islamic sciences (twelfth to 
eighteenth Centuries) had become “hybrid” in style. Rather than indicating tendencies towards a phase of 
“decline” due to “orthodox” adherence to tradition, such texts of legal genre portray a complex culture of 
Islamic law-making in the premodern period. 
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Prefatory Notes on Persian Idioms of Islamic 
Jurisprudence: Reasoning and Procedures 
of Law- Making in Premodern Islamicate India
Naveen  Kanalu
University of California, Los Angeles
The Indian subcontinent was one of the prominent regions in Eastern Islamicate lands for the production and circulation of Islamic manuscripts in the premodern period. While Persian was 
predominantly employed as the language of administration and court cul-
ture, Arabic was, however, the primary language of theologico- religious 
discourses in different branches of Islamic thought such as tafsīr (Qur’anic 
exegesis), kalām (theology), and fiqh (jurisprudence). Compared with pre-
modern Persian works, Arabic treatises produced in the Indian subcontinent 
have oীen been neglected in contemporary scholarship, despite the region 
housing one of the largest collections of Arabic manuscripts in the world. 
This is largely due to the fact that modern Western academic debates has 
privileged the study of Islamic thought িom the Middle Eastern countries 
where Arabic is the spoken language as well as the language of the literati. 
Moreover, South Asian scholars have barely studied the corpus of Arabic texts 
made in the subcontinent.1 Hence, we know little about the transmission, 
1 For a general survey, see Tahera Qutbuddin, “Arabic in India: A Survey and Classifi cation 
of Its Uses, Compared with Persian,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 127, no. 3 (2007): 
315–3܁ 
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transcription, and circulation of Arabic manuscripts in the Indian subcon-
tinent, and even less concerning various ways in which Persian acted as an 
intermediary language for the pedagogical and doctrinal diffusion of Islamic 
knowledge systems available in Arabic to the wider locales of Persian- 
speaking elite subjects. In the present article, I analyze the trajectories of 
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) texts, doctrines, and ideas among ‘ulamā’ (sing. 
‘ālim) or “learned scholars” of the Ḥanafī madhhab (school) of Sunni juris-
prudence in Hindūstān (the northern territories of India). Critically engag-
ing with two works in Persian, I demonstrate some salient linguistic 
registers and styles that help us portray continuities and differences of 
Persian texts of law িom well- established conventions in Arabic. Through 
this study, I make a case for the reassessment of Persian as not only the 
language of political power but equally the language of law.2
Premodern Muslim jurists divided fiqh into two distinct domains: uṣūl 
al- fiqh (the principles of jurisprudence) that furnished legal- theoretic reflec-
tion and furū‘ al- fiqh (the branches of jurisprudence) that were properly 
concerned with the elaboration of legal precepts that were applicable to vari-
ous aspects of individual, social, and political life of Muslims. While the 
former domain broadly pertains to modern conceptions of legal philosophy 
involving logical methods necessary for legal reasoning, the latter relates 
to the practical application of legal reasoning to derive legal precepts. 
Through the early centuries of Islamic jurisprudence, these precepts were 
elaborated to constitute a large corpus that formed the basis for substantive 
law. Both these domains belong to human interpretation of sharī‘a or 
“God’s law.” Muslim jurists reasoned that God’s law in its essence was 
unknowable. However, the deployment of ‘aql (reason) was considered 
essential to elaborate legal precepts, which could asymptotically tend, even 
2 For the cosmopolitan nature of Persian and its political signifi cance, see Muzaff ar Alam, 
The Languages of Political Islam in India, Circa 1200–1800 (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004). 
Critical assessments of the philological and institutional vitality of Persian as a court language 
can be found in Muhammad Abdul Ghani, A History of Persian Language and Literature at the 
Mughal Court, with a Brief Survey of the Growth of Urdu Language, Parts I–II (Allahabad: The 
Indian Press, 1929); Momin Mohiuddin, Chancellary and Persian Epistolography Under the 
Mughals: From Bábur to Sháh Jahán (1526–1658): A Study on Inshá’, Dár al- Inshá’ and Mun-
shís, Based on Original Documents (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1971).
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if in a fallible manner, toward the hidden truth of God’s law. This was 
because reason itself was a human attribute bestowed by God; the right appli-
cation of his law for the right conduct of a Muslim necessarily required 
human interpretation.
Plural forms of textual practices prevailed in the elaboration of Ḥanafī 
jurisprudence in the Indian subcontinent. Formulating legal precepts and 
constructing syllogistic arguments for their derivation required a juridico- 
technical language that Arabic possessed through the jurisprudential and 
theological tradition. Persian, as employed in the Indian context, never 
assumed such a position. The hybrid forms we find in Persian works of 
Islamic law attest to a pragmatic “core” for the composition of such texts. 
They were rarely centered on legal philosophical problems or the epistemic 
reasons underlying rule- making, that is, uṣūl al- fiqh. Rather, Persian works 
offered doctrinally appropriate rules for right conduct for Muslim individu-
als in their quotidian pietistic rites.
In the first section, I develop a brief overview of the range of Islamic 
jurisprudential works that were prevalent in the premodern period when 
northern Indian territories were under the rule of various Delhi Sultanates 
(ca. 1200–1526) and the Mughal Empire at the height of its suzerainty (1526 
to early 1700s). In the second section, I elaborate on various forms of juridi-
cal methods that acted as a primary vehicle for textual transmission. These 
include sharḥ (commentary) and ḥāshiya (gloss) that were meant as pedagogi-
cal guides. They also constituted the means by which juridical opinion was 
used to express a common belonging to the respective madhhab (school), in 
this case, the Ḥanafī one. In the final section, I illustrate elements of content 
and pattern in two Persian texts, Fatāwā- i fīrūzshāhī and Sharḥ- i hidāya, to 
understand the possible ways in which Persian was deployed by jurists for a 
genre of writing dominated by Arabic.
Explicating significant patterns found in these texts, the article reassesses 
the nature of transmission of juridical doctrine িom Arabic to Persian in the 
premodern context. I illustrate authorial attitudes toward the justification of 
rules, norms of commenting on previous texts, and more prominently, limits 
and possibilities of creating thought in a language that lacked the technical-
ity to be a language of law in its immediacy since Arabic had been the 
standard vehicle for legal production. The composition of theological and 
7
Kanalu: Prefatory Notes on Persian Idioms of Islamic Jurisprudence
Published by ScholarlyCommons, 2019
96 | Journal  for  Manuscript  Studies
doctrinal works in Persian had been a common feature in Iran and Central 
Asia as much as Persian was used for works on personal piety and ritual in 
the premodern period. The theologian Ghazali’s (ca. 1058–1111) Kīmīya- i 
sa‘ādat is, perhaps, the most notable example. Yet, we know little about Persian 
legal writing in the Indian subcontinent.
As opposed to a large body of modern scholarship on the formative 
centuries of the classical period (eighth to twelীh centuries), the post- 
classical period remains understudied. This is largely due to the dominance 
of questions concerning the “origins” of Islamic thought in general and 
Islamic law in particular since orientalists began to study them in the nine-
teenth century. Furthermore, as far as Islamic jurisprudence is concerned, 
there was a consensus held in the nineteenth- and twentieth- century idea 
that the gate of ĳtihād (interpretative reasoning) had been closed by the end 
of the Abbasid Caliphate.3 Derivatively, much of our contemporary under-
standing of the post- classical period is postulated on the idea that later 
treatises and commentaries were merely repetitive in nature and rigidly 
adhered to established dogma. This idea has entertained the opinion that 
no significant innovations or variations occurred in Islamic jurisprudence 
িom the thirteenth century onwards. Muslim jurists were supposed to have 
accepted constituted knowledge systems within their jurisprudence.
This position, which was advanced by nineteenth- century orientalists, 
has been increasingly questioned through the study of commentarial prac-
tices as well as scholarly networks that existed in the premodern period.4 
However, in exploring the nature of fiqh discourses in the Indian 
3 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 
69–7۾  Also see Noel J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1964), 182–20ۺ 
4 See Khaled El- Rouayheb, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly 
Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 1–10, for an appraisal of this question in the Middle Eastern context. For a general 
survey of Islamic theological networks in sixteenth- and seventeenth- century Indian subcon-
tinent, see Asad Q. Ahmed and Reza Pourjavardy, “Theology in the Indian Subcontinent,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 606–⒓  
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subcontinent, we are further constrained by the fact that the production 
and circulation of Islamic thought largely overlaps with the post- classical 
period as Islamic intellectual culture in the region emerged much later than 
in the Middle East. This leads to a difficult presupposition that Islamic 
knowledge systems in the subcontinent merely imitated established prac-
tices িom elsewhere. However, there are several difficulties in making such 
judgments. Even a partial illustration of this intellectual history requires 
the knowledge of manuscript circulation and commentarial practices involv-
ing annotations, marginalia, and glossaries. First, we have little knowledge 
of the manuscripts themselves and the proliferation of various genres of 
legal disputations. Second, due to the neglect in the study of manuscript 
circulation among various intellectual networks, little philological and text- 
critical study, let alone an elaborate reconstruction of Islamic intellectual 
history, has appeared so far in the Indian context.5 As a corollary, the con-
tents, doctrines, and positions within classical jurisprudential texts are very 
oীen considered the locus classicus without accounting for successive itera-
tions of the intellectual culture in the premodern period. A clarification of 
these difficulties requires us to rethink fiqh production in the subcontinent 
as a continuum with Transoxanian juridical thought that widely prolifer-
ated in the region since at least the thirteenth century.
What were the interpretative mechanisms that premodern Ḥanafī jurists 
used to develop positive legal norms, and what were the variations in their 
jurisprudential style? I examine this concern through a reading of manu-
scripts of two types of juridical texts belonging to furū‘ al- fiqh: fatāwā (sing. 
fatwā; collations of legal precepts) and sharḥ (commentary), both composed 
in Persian. The former is Sadr al- Dīn Ya‘qūb Muzaffar Kirmānī’s Fatāwā- i 
fīrūzshāhī (known sometimes as Fiqh- i fīrūzshāhī) িom the fourteenth cen-
tury, and the latter is ‘Abd al- Ḥaqq Sajādil Sirhindī’s Sharḥ- i hidāya িom 
the late seventeenth- century Mughal Empire. Critically analyzing the 
internal construction of these two works that remain in manuscript form to 
5 A handful of fatāwā and sharḥ texts were edited and lithographed in the nineteenth 
century and rendered into modern Urdu. However, none of these texts have been translated 
into English.
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date, I argue not only for the persistence and development of Islamic juridi-
cal thought in the post- classical Islamic period (twelীh to eighteenth cen-
turies) but equally its diffusion in Persian.
Forms of Constructing Juridical Discourse: Genres and Texts
The production of furū‘ al- fiqh texts in the Indian subcontinent spans িom 
as early as the thirteenth century to the nineteenth century under late 
colonial British rule. The dominant genre of legal writings is known as 
fatāwā.6 Though the original meaning of the term fatwā in Arabic desig-
nates a responsa issued by a muftī (jurisconsult), in premodern jurisprudence, 
fatawā had become a genre of legal writing.7 These texts were collations of 
legal precepts and positions of jurists that were arranged in kitābs (books) 
dealing with various aspects of personal conduct such as purification, ablu-
tion, performance of prayer, as well as conduct that was intersubjective in 
nature, namely, marriage, divorce, commerce, sale, and so on. Fatawā col-
lections, as they developed in the Indian subcontinent, were not merely a set 
of responsa issued against a legal opinion sought by an individual িom a 
muftī. Instead they collated the different states and stages of right conduct 
that a Muslim individual had to abide by. Given the structural nature 
of Islamic law, which was not a law িamed by political authorities such 
as the Sultan, it emerged as a jurists’ law brought about by consensus, 
disagreement, and interpretation within an established tradition such as 
the Ḥanafī school.8 Fatawā were, therefore, collations that did not ratio-
nalize conflicts of interpretation on a particular matter but involved only 
the enunciation of different juridical positions to provide a comprehensive 
6 Zafarul Islam, “Origin and Development of Fatāwā Compilation in Medieval India,” 
Studies in History 12, no. 2 (1996): 223–2ۿ 
7 In premodern Islamic jurisprudential culture, the following distinctions of juridical offi  ces 
and positions are relevant: fuqahā’ (sing. faqīh; jurists), muftūn (sing. mufti; jurisconsults), and 
quḍāt (sing. qāḍī; magistrates). Scholars oী en combined two or more of these functions. They 
were generically called ‘ulamā’ (sing. ‘ālim; learned scholars).
8 Wael B. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2001), 57–8۾ 
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understanding of how previous jurists of the madhhab or “school” (desig-
nated aṣḥābunā) reflected regrouping of the positions on any legal proposi-
tion or opinion. Al- fatāwā al- ‘ālamkīrīyya (Institutions of the World 
Conqueror), compiled in the 1660s at the Mughal imperial court by the 
order of emperor Aurangzeb ‘Ālamgīr (r. 1658–1707), not so much lays out 
legal definitions and explanations as appraises the positions of previous 
jurists. For instance, on matters pertaining to how kharāj (land tax) had to 
be imposed, the rate of taxation based on the quality and other conditions 
of land, the appropriate period of collection, and whether tax could be col-
lected in cash or in kind, the authors expose us to the doctrines of works 
such as Abū Yūsuf ’s (d. 767) Kitāb al- kharāj, previous fatāwā collections 
such as Fatāwā- i qāḍīkhān.9
The proliferation of these compilations and collations over several cen-
turies constituted a corpus by themselves of legal writing that not only 
provided referential compendia to locate divergent legal positions of Ḥanafī 
jurists but also allowed later jurists to read them to synthesize the differ-
ences and form their own legal opinion. Premodern Muslim jurists gained 
reputation not only through their deep knowledge of the legal corpus but, 
more importantly, their ability to interpret them, distinguish between gen-
eral and particular propositions, and syllogistically derive their own legal 
position based on reasoning. With the notable exception of Al- fatāwā al- 
‘ālamkīrīyya that was compiled by several jurists under the guidance of 
Shaikh Nizām, most fatāwā were made by individual Ḥanafī jurists for their 
rulers. To mention a few, these include ‘Ālim ibn ‘Alā Ḥanafī’s (d. 1397) 
Al- fatāwā al- tātārkhānīyya, Shihāb al- Dīn Ahmad Nizām al- Jīlānī’s Al- fatāwā 
al- ibrāhīmshāhīyya (sixteenth century), Muḥammad Amīn Mu’minābādī’s 
Fatāwā- i amīnīya (mid- sixteenth century), and Naṣīr al- Dīn Lāhaurī’s 
Fatāwā- i barahna (early seventeenth century).
 From a genealogical perspective, Islamic legal texts in India owe their 
origins to debates among Transoxanian jurists িom the twelীh century 
9 Shaikh Nizām et al., Al- fatāwā al- ‘ālamkīrīyya al- maʻrū fa baina al- nā s bi al- fatā wā al- 
hindī yya f ī madhhab al- imā m abī ḥanī fa al- nuʻmā n ta’lī f jamā ʻa min ʻulamā ’ al- hind wa kā na 
raʾī suhum f ī ta’lī fi hā maulā nā al- shaikh niẓā m wa dhā lika bi ’amr al- sulṭā n abī al- muẓaff ar 
muhyī al- dī n muḥammad aurangzīb bahā dur ʻālamkī r, vol. 2 (Cairo: s.n., 1865), 219–2ۺ 
11
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onward, and most notably, Fakhr al- Dīn Ḥasan ibn Manṣūr al- Farghānī’s 
compilation, Fatāwā- i qāḍīkhān. Beyond fatāwā compendia, Transoxanian 
doctrinal writings and pedagogical guides constituted the corpus for teach-
ing and transmission of the knowledge of fiqh in madrasas. Burhān al- Dīn 
‘Alī ibn Bakr al- Marghīnānī’s (d. 1197) Al- hidāya sharḥ bidāyat al- mubtadı̄ fı̄ 
al- fiqh (the “Guidance”) was foremost among the Transoxanian works that 
circulated in the Indian subcontinent.10 Other prominent works whose 
manuscripts can be still found in collections across the subcontinent are 
Imām Burhān al- Sharī‘a Mahmūd ibn al- Sharī‘a ‘Ubaid Allah’s Al- wiqāya 
al- riwāya fī masā’ il al- hidāya (an Arabic commentary on Al- hidāya), and 
Najm al- Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar ibn Muḥammad al- Nasafī’s (d. 1142) Kanz 
al- daqā’ iq. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al- Rashīd al- Sajāwandī’s (fl. eleventh cen-
tury) treatise on inheritance laws, Farā’ iḍ al- sajāwandī (commonly known 
as Al- sirājīyya), also circulated widely in the teaching of inheritance and 
property rights among Ḥanafī jurists.
A thorough understanding of many of these juridical works and the 
manner in which they were employed in the transmission of Ḥanafī legal 
doctrine is lacking. Even during the early British colonial rule, a handful of 
texts were translated and commented, mainly those that colonial adminis-
trators and orientalists thought could have legal applicability and enforce-
ability in forms such as digests, codes of law, and so on.11 The British 
orientalist William Jones (1746–1794) translated Al- sirājīyya, whereas 
Charles Hamilton (1753–1792) translated a Persian rendering of Al- hidāya 
into English.12 Both of these Transoxanian works were, however, not texts 
10 Al- hidāya was the most extensively read and commented Ḥanafī legal text in Central Asia, 
the Indian subcontinent, and the territories of the Ottoman Empire in premodern times. 
Several hundreds, if not thousands, of manuscripts exist in collections around the world. 
11 I have argued elsewhere on the philological and legal- philosophical foundations of early 
British engagement with premodern Islamic legal texts in the region. See Naveen Kanalu, 
“The Pure Reason of Lex Scripta: Jurisprudential Philology and the Domain of Instituted 
Laws During Early British Colonial Rule in India (1770s–1820s),” in Empires and Legal 
Thought: Ideas and Institutions from the Ancient World to the Modern World, ed. Edward Cava-
nagh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
12 William Jones, “Al Sirájiyyah; or, The Mohammedan Law of Inheritance,” in Works of 
William Jones in Six Volumes, vol. 3 (London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1799), 507–9ۻ  See 
12
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of legal compilation such as the fatāwā, which resemble broadly what we 
consider substantive law. Instead, they combined functions of transmitting 
juridical knowledge in three forms, pedagogy, commentary, and doctrine, 
that I will examine in the next two sections.
Post- Classical Islamic Jurisprudence: 
Reasoning and Making Law
A predominant feature of post- classical Islamic juridical thought is the 
extensive development of sharḥ (commentary) and ḥāshiya (super- commentary) 
as a method of reading and interpreting “classical” texts. Even though their 
original function was the conservation of a textual tradition, the prolifera-
tion of a vast set of commentaries on previous commentaries produced a 
distinct corpus whose primary purpose was juridical reasoning on how appro-
priate rules could be িamed.
Al- Marghīnānī’s Al- hidāya itself is a sharḥ that the Transoxanian jurist 
composed on his earlier works. Ya’akov Meron has argued that the work 
িom the twelীh century played a critical role in the shiী toward a distinct 
understanding of legal practice through changed reasoning supplied by 
Al- Marghīnānī that has been practiced ever since.13 For instance, most 
jurisprudential works composed in the period aীer him closely align their 
textual organization in keeping with the classification that Al- Marghīnānī 
made among the kitābs (books). More significantly, the work seems to have 
primarily supplied, given its very name, the “Guidance,” a form of pedagogical 
text for teaching and transmission of legal precepts rather than constitute 
Charles Hamilton, The Hedaya, or Guide: A Commentary on the Mussulman Laws, vol. 1 
(London: T. Bensley, 1791).
13 See Ya’akov Meron, “Marghīnānī, His Method and His Legacy,” Islamic Law and Society 
9, no. 3 (2002): 410–16, for an assessment of innovations made by Al- Marghīnānī in reorga-
nizing the arrangement and order of kitābs (books) based on pragmatic considerations. Despite 
his detailed study of Al- hidāya, Meron’s extreme position that “Post Classical verbiage is 
strictly of no value ি om a juridical point of view” is unhelpful. Ya’akov Meron, “The Develop-
ment of Legal Thought in Hanafi  Texts,” Studia Islamica 30 (1969): 92–9܁  
13
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positive law.14 Instead, it provided the substratum for fatāwā collections. In 
Wael Hallaq’s thesis, since later fatwas issued by jurisconsults had validity 
over previous ones, their compilation brought about the elaboration of new 
legal precepts.15 Even if the processual nature of accumulated legal precepts 
formed a corpus of substantive law, this does not resolve the epistemological 
question of how and when fatāwā became a historically recognized juridical 
genre among jurists through their gradual detachment িom the juriscon-
sults’ “responsa.”
In the Indian context, Al- hidāya and other Transoxanian “commentar-
ies” in Arabic circulated at least িom the thirteenth century. Persian had 
already been used for compiling fatāwā by the fourteenth century. Extant 
manuscript sources do not allow us to date Persian- language commentaries 
though to a period prior to the early seventeenth or, at best, the late six-
teenth century. It is only িom the mid- seventeenth century that a range of 
Transoxanian commentaries like Al- hidāya, Al- wiqāya, and Al- Sirājīyya were 
commented in Persian. They explained the meaning of juridical terms as 
well as propositions contained in uṣūl (sources) of law. Manuscripts of these 
works abound in marginalia and, more importantly, glosses, which are a key 
to discern methods of reading techniques among jurists. While marginalia 
are especially useful to know the specific opinions that might have been 
held, rejected, or revised in the reading, glosses offer a continuous writing 
across and along the text itself and hence double the act of writing, thereby, 
becoming “super- commentaries” in their own right.
Manuscripts of fiqh িom the Indian subcontinent can be found in diver-
gent legal genres. Their significance, however, lies in the abundance of 
fatāwā, which were compiled at the instance of the rulers to offer coherent 
legal rules for political and administrative mechanisms in the sultanates. We 
may understand these fatāwā works as equivalent to a corpus of substantive 
14 The modern status of Al- hidāya as a book of legal principles to derive positive law is 
largely based on colonial scholarship on Ḥanafī juridical texts. Hamilton, in particular, attrib-
uted it a “canonical authority” for making laws while it was an authoritative commentary for 
premodern Ḥanafī jurists. Hamilton, The Hedaya, or Guide, xliv.
15 Wael Hallaq, “From Fatwās to Furū‘: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law,” 
Islamic Law and Society 1, no. 1 (1994): 48–5ۺ  
14
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law, for which reason they were never commented upon. Sharḥs or ḥāshiyas, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, fatāwā were the major forms for the 
transmission of juridical knowledge and presupposed each other’s existence 
in explaining right conduct.
 Commentaries by themselves were never considered sufficient for juridi-
cal reasoning. For premodern Ḥanafī jurists, the nomothetic principles they 
followed had two layers. On the one hand, these principles were governed 
by logical methods of deriving laws particular to the Muslim community. 
On the other hand, since juridical reasoning formed only a part within the 
application of reason, reason also transcended the particularity of fiqh. This 
aspect is revealed implicitly in commentaries to the extent that they engage 
in reasoning. However, fatāwā collections explicitly postulate the necessity 
of this hypothesis to sustain the science of jurisprudence. The compilers of 
Al- fatāwā al- ‘ālamkīrīyya speciূ in their prefatory introduction that the col-
lation of legal precepts not only does not invalidate reasoning, but requires 
its active synthesis in formulating right norms for right conduct. Since mere 
rule following did not suffice to understand appropriate action, Al- fatāwā 
al- ‘ālamkīrīyya internally explains the need to examine legal precepts through 
the deployment of “evidence” and of “demonstration” (al- dalīl wa al- burhān).16 
They are to be found in ‘aql (human reason) that is outside the content 
inherent in legal precepts. Such reasoning is deeply encrusted within the 
textual structure and propositional content of the work as it presents posi-
tions of distinct legal texts িom the past without necessarily demonstrating 
the definitive norm that could be put into practice. The method of collation 
in the fatāwā, therefore, presupposes the need for sharḥ as a mode of juridi-
cal scholarship to resolve internal contradictions in the difference of opinion 
among jurists involving semantic, logical, and propositional content. Sharḥs 
were the jurists’ guidebooks in which the reader educated in jurisprudential 
thought could apply logical and juridical reasoning.
For premodern Ḥanafī jurists in the Indian subcontinent as much as in 
Transoxiana, fatāwā collections supplied the rules, whose interpretation 
16 Nizām et al., Al- fatāwā al- ‘ālamkīrīyya al- maʻrū fa baina al- nā s bi al- fatā wā al- hindī yya, 1:ۼ 
15
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required recourse to works such as Al- Marghīnānī’s Al- hidāya and com-
mentaries on it. The set of early Ḥanafī juridical writings attributed to Abū 
Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, and Shaybānī known collectively as ẓāhir al- riwāya 
constituted valid doctrine. However, as Brannon Wheeler has pointed out, 
the citation of authoritative works did not impede ikhtilāf (juristic disagree-
ment) on the opinions of previous jurists.17 On the contrary, multiple layers 
of successive commentaries allowed jurists, despite their explicit allegiance 
to authoritative works, to revise their formulations in style and content 
based on the purpose to which a text was put. Manuscript copies oীen 
reveal this hybrid nature of commentarial practices wherein the neat dis-
tinction between “paraphrasing commentary and running commentary” 
proposed by L. W. C. (Eric) Van Lit for Arabic- language commentarial 
works cannot be easily made within Persian legal works.18 The former, he 
contends, explains a set of arguments paragraph- wise, whereas the latter 
pertains to clarification at the sentence level of the text. Especially, sharḥs 
composed in Persian do not reveal such distinction since they do not strictly 
adhere to Arabic conventional modes of juridical explanation.
Variations in idiom, style, and composition invariably creep into pre-
modern juridical thought, which cannot be explained through inflections 
in “authorial intention.” Two reasons can be adduced for this process. First, 
jurists are concerned with elaborating the meaning of rules, which fit into 
a system of reasoning that is beyond the control of any particular individual. 
Instead, they are attributable to the logical procedures necessary to justiূ 
any rule. Second, the language of law, despite differences we may find 
between juridical systems (be they Islamic, Hindu, Roman, etc.), is univer-
sally abstract in nature. Law portrays an impersonal and an atemporal voice 
wherein jurists hardly interrupt legal formulation through recourse to nar-
rative style. Even when they provide examples of legal disputes, they do so 
17 Brannon M. Wheeler, “Identity in the Margins: Unpublished Ḥanafī Commentaries on 
the Mukhtaṣar of Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al- Qudūrī,” Islamic Law and Society 10, no. 2 
(2003): 18܁ 
18 L. W. C. (Eric) Van Lit, “Commentary and Commentary Tradition: The Basic Terms of 
Understanding Islamic Intellectual History,” MIDÉO: Mélanges de l’Institut dominicain d’études 
orientales 32 (2017): 3–2ۿ 
16
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only to the extent required িom the perspective of legal resolution. The 
study of textual transmission of premodern juridical texts is challenging since 
law speaks to us in an un- authorial and abstract manner where the internal 
cohesion of a legal norm is the primary criteria for its validity rather than 
what the author believes has to be the case. This un- authorial nature of law 
is mirrored in the universal validity that law claims for itself as being authori-
tative insofar as law stipulates rules, conditions, and conduct within a 
theologico- political environment. The authority of law and its un- authorial 
form are co- constituted.
Formulating .Hanafī Juristic Ideas: Persian Idioms of Law
Fatāwā compilations were occasionally composed in Persian in the Indian 
subcontinent since at least the fourteenth century. One of the earliest works 
we can date in Persian, Sadr al- Dīn Ya‘qūb Muzaffar Kirmānī’s Fatāwā- i 
fīrūzshāhī, dedicated to the Tughlaq Sultan, Abū al- Muzaffar Sultān Fīrūz 
Shāh (r. 1351–88) provides a rare glimpse into the establishment of a genre 
of juridical writing িom a generic legal instrument, fatwā, or a responsa. 
Fatāwā- i fīrūzshāhī follows the pattern of ordering kitābs laid out in Al- 
hidāya, one of its authoritative references. Yet, Kirmānī’s convention of 
juridical analyses is not to adopt Al- Marghīnānī’s method of positing legal 
precepts, adducing previous textual proofs to validate them, and then giving 
his own exegesis upon the problem. Instead, Kirmānī understands fatāwā to 
mean a collection of individual responsa made by a competent muftī (juris-
consult). Responsa was a “classical” genre of writing, but one that had a purely 
practical necessity (unlike treatises or commentaries, which offered clarifica-
tion) known as istiftā’ (a formal legal opinion). Istiftā’ arose িom any Muslim 
individual’s consultation with a muftī who gave his opinion in the form of a 
fatwā or responsa to solve a particular legal problem.
The practically oriented solution given in a fatwā by itself could not be 
transformed into a valid legal precept. However, when a large number of 
legal cases had accumulated, they oীen compiled and transmitted them as 
valid legal opinions. Thus, in turn, as is made explicit in Fatāwā- i fīrūzshāhī’s 
style, istiftā’ became a genre of posing an ensemble of possible juridical 
17
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questions to resolve disputes between divergent legal opinions or clariূing 
the appropriateness of specific forms of action. For instance, the norms for 
wuḍū‘ (ablution), a necessary act prior to offering prayer, are demonstrated 
by the various forms of hypothetical istiftā’ and responsa given to them.19 Or, 
for instance, in Kitāb al- farā’ iḍ (book of inheritance), Kirmānī poses one 
of the classical problems in inheritance laws. If parents were kāfirs (non- 
believers) who became Muslims, did children born prior to their conversion 
have the right to inherit property as per the stipulations of Ḥanafī rules? 
Kirmānī unambiguously gives an affirmative answer without supplying the 
necessary reasoning found in Al- sirājīyya where al- Sajāwandī maintained 
that the religious denomination of the parents could not prejudice their 
children.20 This is because Kirmānī’s fatāwā were destined for extracting 
applicable rules rather than commenting upon the reasons for the formula-
tion of such rules. Even though individuals might have consulted juriscon-
sults for praxis, advice, and opinion, doctrinal reasoning for legal norms 
were grounded in works like Al- sirājīyya. The latter explained the reasoning 
behind a rule, which was not a precedent. Precedent was not a valid form of 
justiূing legal norms in premodern Islamic law, but reason was.
 Furthermore, authoritative fatāwā follow a pattern of regular collections 
of legal precepts and reasoning laid out by classical jurists on each topic of 
juridical doctrine. They could be personal matters like zakāt (alms), nikāḥ 
(marriage), ṭalāq (divorce), hajj (pilgrimage), or those pertaining to civil and 
public affairs of a Muslim polity such as the principles of taxation for ‘ushr 
(tithe) and kharāj (land tax). This is particularly the case as these genres of 
works were meant to be compendia that were read to clariূ disagreements 
among jurists. They do not constitute any resolution by themselves but are 
merely the opinions of various jurists to whom the author owes a shared 
tradition of belonging as a member of a particular madhhab. However, the 
manuscript of Kirmānī’s work does not reveal any such intricacies and 
collates a series of questions and answers. The reason for Kirmānī’s method 
can be corroborated by the fact that he relies to a large extent on another 
19 Sadr al- Dīn Ya‘qūb Muzaff ar Kirmānī, Fatāwā- i f īrūzshāhī (MS 22831, Andhra Pradesh 
Oriental Manuscript Library and Research Institute, Hyderabad), 4–ۿ 
20 Kirmānī, Fatāwā- i f īrūzshāhī, 4⒘  
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loose genre of juridical writing, wāqi‘āt (events) (for example, Wāqi‘āt- i 
ḥasāmīyya, Wāqi‘āt- i zahīrīyya, Wāqi‘āt- i ḥāmīyya, etc.). Wāqi‘āt report a col-
lection of real incidents that had taken place (such as legal disputes) and the 
legal solutions the jurists offered. These reports and responsa form the pri-
mary texts for Kirmānī’s work rather than abstract legal norms. Hence, 
manuscript copies of the work do not contain commentaries or detailed 
glosses aside িom the clarification of technical terms. Perhaps the absence of 
these features suggests that Persian fatāwā had pragmatic rather than doc-
trinal uses.
Ḥanafī sharḥs (commentaries) in Persian, which appeared later than 
fatāwā, are less juridico- technical in nature but are a key to understanding 
reading practices. ‘Abd al- Ḥaqq Sajādil Sirhindī’s Sharḥ- i hidāya, a Persian 
commentary on Al- Marghīnānī’s Al- hidāya, survives in a single manu-
script, dated 5 November 1694, that was copied by Jān Muḥammad- i 
Qaum- i Shaikhzāda- i ‘Abbāsī িom Lahore in present- day Pakistan.21 
Sajādil Sirhindī also composed a Persian commentary on ‘Ubaid Allah’s 
Al- wiqāya al- riwāya fī masā’ il al- hidāya, called Masā’ il- i sharḥ- i wiqāya. Both 
works are dedicated to the Mughal Sultan, Aurangzeb ʻĀlamgır̄. Sirhindī 
says he undertook the Persian commentary on Al- hidāya for the fāyida 
(benefit) of ahl- i islām or the “community of Muslims,” as he had done 
with his earlier work, Masā’ il- i sharḥ- i wiqāya.22 Unfortunately, tadhkiras 
(biographical compendia) of Ḥanafī jurists do not provide us with much 
information about Sajādil Sirhindī. The earliest reference to Sharḥ- i hidāya 
I have been able to trace is John Herbert Harington’s (1765–1828) extended 
essay “Remarks upon the Authorities of Mosulman Law.” 23 Harington, 
21 The northwestern regions of the Mughal Empire (in particular, the ṣūba [province] of 
Lahore) had become a center for the settlement of itinerant émigré Sunni intellectuals not 
only ি om Transoxania but also Iran. Lahore, which was one among Mughal dār al- ṣalṭanat 
or imperial capitals alongside Delhi and Agra, also provided opportunities for the ‘ulamā’ to 
gain access to courtly services. 
22 ‘Abd al- Ḥaqq Sajādil Sirhindī, Sharḥ- i hidāya, Ms. 361, India Offi  ce Islamic Collection, 
British Library, ۺ 
23 John Herbert Harington, “Remarks upon the Authorities of Mosulman Law,” Asiatic 
Researches; or, the Transactions of the Society instituted in Bengal, For Inquiring into the History 
and Antiquities; The Arts, Sciences and Literature, of Asia 10 (1811): 50ۺ 
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who worked as Persian translator in the British East India Company’s Rev-
enue department in Calcutta, had even suggested editing this text. He 
thought a Mughal Persian commentary on Marghīnānī’s work could, aীer 
all, aid court officials, British judges, and “native” maulvis better appreciate 
Charles Hamilton’s English rendering.24
Several elements within the text indicate that although the work itself is 
entitled sharḥ, it is distinct insofar as furū‘ al- fiqh texts িom the thirteenth 
century onward were composed in Arabic in Transoxania and the Middle 
East. In the Arabic commentarial tradition, the significant manner of 
explanation follows the conventional language of fiqh texts, which provide 
various authorial positions such as Al- Qudūrī’s Mukhtaṣar, Al- hidāya, Al- 
wiqāya and Hāfiz al- Dīn al- Nasafī’s Kanz al- daqā’ iq. Beginning with a clas-
sical praise of Allah in Arabic, Sajādil Sirhindī’s manuscript is replete with 
interlinear glosses on Qur’anic verses and qawl- i paigambar (ḥadīth, or the 
sayings of the prophet). Notably, Sajādil Sirhindī maintains the Arabic sty-
listic common to fatāwās rather than commentaries, as he indexically refers 
to Al- kāfī and Ghāyat al- bayān as authorities by the phrase wa kadhā fī (such 
as it is in) to enumerate the legal norm. Had it been a commentary stricto 
sensu, Sharḥ- i hidāya would have instead employed huwa kadhā wa kadhā (it 
is . . . such and such) to lay out the definition and explain it.25
How did Persian commentaries exhibit the syllogistic argumentation 
method deployed in fiqh texts? Sajādil Sirhindī’s recourse to qiyās (analogical 
deduction) in kitāb dar bayān- i ṭahārat (kitāb al- ṭahāra in Arabic; the “book 
on purification”) is limited to the contingent and conventional meaning of 
qiyās, the fourth source of law, rather than the hierarchized ordering of 
argumentation laid out in the formal doctrine on qiyās.26 Sajādil Sirhindī 
24 Maulvis were Muslim legal scholars that the British government recruited to facilitate the 
interpretation of laws.
25 Wheeler, “Identity in the Margins,” 18܁ 
26 Sajādil Sirhindī, Sharḥ- i hidāya, ܃   In the conventional norms of fi qh treatises, kitāb al- 
ṭahāra constitutes the introductory book. Charles Hamilton omitted both the fi rst book and 
the second on kitāb al- ṣalāh or the “book on prayer.” Rather, he begins with the third book, 
kitāb al- zakāt (book on alms) as the fi rst. This misrepresentation owes to the presumption 
that purifi cation and prayer were purely ritualistic aspects of religious practice with no conse-
quences for legal relations. 
20
Manuscript Studies, Vol. 4 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://repository.upenn.edu/mss_sims/vol4/iss1/5
Kanalu, Law- Making in Premodern India | 109
most oীen applies only a fourth type based on similarity between two cases 
wherein the original legal norm becomes valid in a new case that displays 
shared features with the old case. Rather than construct a syllogistic propo-
sition, Sajādil Sirhindī describes the new case as embodying similar features. 
He eschews িom explicitly indicating the ratio legis, “the attribute common 
to both the new and original cases.”27
Sharḥ- i hidāya occults distinctions of “paraphrasing” and “running” 
commentary since the author’s intention is not to condense the main argu-
ment. Instead, he provides a loose rendering of the key doctrinal evidence 
contained in Al- hidāya, that is, the “sources” that formed the basis of Al- 
Marghīnānī’s writings in the first place. Sharḥ- i hidāya is more appropriately 
a gloss on juridical texts that falls within the category called ḥāshiya (super- 
commentary) rather than sharḥ. In premodern manuscripts, ḥāshiya is com-
posed around the text of a treatise or its sharḥ filling the margins. Ḥāshiya 
does not appear independently in manuscripts since it is intended for the 
reader to interpret obscure individual elements of a text (terms, proposi-
tions, grammatical particularities, logical categories implicit in an argu-
ment, etc.). In Sajādil Sirhindī’s work, ḥāshiya takes center place and is 
further glossed in interlinear margins by the hand of a reader. Manuscripts 
like these were perhaps notes that jurists compiled and used as teaching aids 
in madrasas.
Conclusion
Fatāwā and sharḥs constitute a significant corpus to understand methods by 
which Ḥanafī jurists practiced their juridical thinking, interpreted, and 
transmitted their ideas for future generations of scholars. In the Indian 
context, the examination of manuscripts reveals juridical hermeneutic prac-
tices that are obscured in the highly polarized manner in which the ‘ulamā’ 
27 Wael B. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 2ۼ 
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(learned scholars) have been represented in the historiography.28 Their 
associative role has been analyzed purely in the realm of juridical and 
political services they offered to sultans in return for land grants and the 
maintenance of educational institutions. More oীen, they are assumed to 
represent the “orthodox” wing of premodern Islam in India.
The study of juridical texts and manuscripts not only reveals complexity 
within doctrinal argumentation but also allows for the differentiation of 
juridical functions that the ‘ulamā’ held. Moreover, Persian renderings of 
Islamic jurisprudence, which do not possess Arabic- style, technically spe-
cific formulations, exhibit “hybridity” in their method. Partly, this is due to 
the fact that Arabic was the theological language across Islamic cultures. It 
was the source of sunna or the foundational texts for sharī‘a: the Qur’ān and 
the ḥadīth (prophet’s sayings) as well as “classical” writings (eighth to twelীh 
centuries) that established patterns for the juridical genre. On the contrary, 
Persian fiqh works pose challenges, as they do not strictly fall into distinct 
categories of commentarial methods that had existed in the historical gene-
alogy of Islamic thought. The significance of Persian juridical writings, be 
they fatāwā or sharḥs, has to be located in the praxis of Islamic law among 
premodern Ḥanafī jurists but also the extent to which they offered juristic 
assistance to sultans, nobility and administrative officers in the “implemen-
tation of law.”
Persian, the administrative and court language in large parts of the 
Indian subcontinent, acted as an intermediary for the filtration of Islamic 
legal precepts; it was also, as we have seen, one of the languages in which 
idioms of Islamic law had been extensively produced in the form of fatāwā 
and commentaries. No doubt, various forms of law- making other than fiqh- 
based law were prevalent during the Islamicate rule of the Delhi Sultanates 
and the Mughal Empire. These laws could range িom zawābit (orders) and 
28 See Aziz Ahmad, “The Role of Ulema in Indo- Muslim History,” Studia Islamica 31 
(1970): 6, for a general trans- historical evaluation. Historiography on the Delhi Sultanates 
and the Mughal Empire privileges the spiritual role played by Sufi  saints due to their “hetero-
dox” and “mystic” visions of polity, religion, and social interaction. The ‘ulamā’ are oী en 
portrayed negatively as opposed to mysticism, while much of their writings have not yet been 
studied.
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dastūr al- ‘amal (regulations) promulgated by rulers in Persian to “custom-
ary” and institutional practices prevalent in different parts of the subconti-
nent that are available in regional languages. Nevertheless, the use of Persian 
was not merely limited to mundane procedures of legal instruments, court 
documents, and attestations. Persian also contained an idiom of law- making 
within the contours of fiqh, to whose manuscript and intellectual histories 
we need to be attentive in understanding the premodern legal past of the 
subcontinent. In this article, I have laid out a set of themes and propositions 
on the genealogy of the Islamic legal tradition in the region, the specificities 
in Persian works, and the epistemological problems related to their inter-
pretation within the general category of “law” as we understand it today. 
The dialectic between jurisprudence, law- making, and implementation—
that is, the juridical domains, which I have dealt with in a prefatory form—
configured as much the political domains of Persian in premodern Hindūstān.
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